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Radey v. McCurdy, 58 At. 558 (igO4).-The question involved in this case is whether a tenant who has secured a new
lease in the nature of an extensionx of the old lease thereby forfeits his right to trade fixtures erected during the old lease and
which he could have removed during that term.
This point has con:e up in a number of jurisdictions, and the
decisions of some of the different states are not reconcilable.
One line of cases holds that the tenant, by accepting a new
lease, in which no mention is made of trade fixtures erected
during the old lease, thereby abandons his right to them. It
was within his power to except them from the lease, and not
having done so he is presumed to have leased from the landlord everything on the premises. Whereas, the cases on the
other side hold that the tenant does not lose his right to remove
the trade fixtures, as his occupation has been continuous and
therefore no presumption of an intention to abandon them to
3V$
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the landlord can arise. There was no need to except from the
lease what unquestionably belonged to the tenant.
The case of Radey v. McCurdy, 58 Atl. 558, decided by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1904, was a case in which
premises were leased to McCurdy Brothers for the term of ten
years. The firm of McCurdy Brothers consisted of James and
John McCurdy. During the term James bought all of John's
interest in the business. Three months before the expiration
of the lease a new lease of the said premises was executed to
McCurdy Brothers, consisting of James and Samuel, another
brother. This was said to be" an extended and renewed lease."
Before the expiration of the second lease the lessees started
to remove trade fixtures erected by them during the old lease.
The lessors filed a bill to restrain their removal. The court in
refusing to grant the injunction said in part: "They [trade
fixtures] are not put in for the benefit of the landlord, and until
the tenant leaves them on the premises in which he no longer

has any interest, no intention can be imputed to abandon them
to his lessor. .

.

. Abandonment being a question of intention,

it cannot be that under the undisputed facts in this case the
lessees ever intended to or did abandon their trade fixtures."
This doctrine is in accord with the case of Devin. v. Dougherty,
27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 461, where under a similar state of facts
it was argued that the tenant lost his right to fixtures, for,
since no mention was made of them in the second lease, he
therefore rented everything on the premises, and is estopped
from denying his landlord's title to them; but the court in that
case said: "As the new lease was intended merely to provide
for a further occupancy of the premises, and that for the same
purpose, I see not why it was necessary for the tenant to reserve
in it any rights in regard to a thing which was his, and which
it must have been understood he was to continue to use as his
own during his new term. He hired for a second time his landlord's premises; but how can that be said to be also a hiring
of property, upon these premises, which belonged to himself
and which as yet he had a right to use upon those premises
under a lease still in force?"
The best known case on the other side of this questidn is
Loughram v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792 (1871), in which the court
said: "In reason and principle the acceptance of a lease of the
premises, including the buildings, without any reservation of
right or mention of any claim to the buildings and fixtures,
and occupation under the new letting, are equivalent to a surrender of the possession to the landlord at the expiration of the
first term. The tenant is in under a new tenancy and not under
the old, and the rights which existed under the former tenancy
and which are not claimed or exercised are abandoned as
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effectually as if the tenant had actually removed from the
premises, and after an interval of time, shorter or longer, had
taken another lease and returned to the premises." This case
has been followed in New York and a number of other states.
Lewis v. 0. N. and P. Co., 125 N. Y. 341; Talbot v. Cruger,
151 N. Y. IH7; Watriss v. Bank, 124 Mass. 571; Sanitary
District of Chicago v. Cook, 169 Ill. 184. It was referred to
in Kerr v. Kingsbury, 39 Mich. i5O (1878), where the court
in an opinion by Justice Cooley, in refusing to follow it, said:
"This is perfectly true if the lease includes the buildings, but
unless it does so in terms or by necessary implication, it is
begging the whole question to assume that the lease included
the buildings as a part of the realty. In our opinion it ought
not to be held to include them unless from the lease itself an
understanding to that effect is plainly inferable."
This extract from Justice Cooley's opinion seems to me to
show the fallacy on which the New York decision is based.
Why an intention of an abandonment is presumed it is impossible to see. The presumption of an abandonment is a fiction
of the law which grew up in the cases where a tenant, at the
expiration of his lease, left without removing his trade fixtures.
On the gruunds of public policy, to protect the landlord or his
new tenant, who took the premises as they stood, from being
disturbed in their possession by the old -tenant claiming what
he left on the premises, the courts refused to allow the old
tenant to take his fixtures. They therefore said, "We will
presume that the tenant intended to make a gift of the fixtures
to his landlord." The courts have not extended this doctrine
any further than the class of cases it was intended to remedy.
Thus where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his
lease, his right to remove fixtures remains until he surrenders
possession to the landlord. "It would seem that the reason
upon which the courts have based the rule that the tenant
cannot re-enter and remove his fixtures after surrender of the
possession under his lease is, that such surrender is presumed
to be intended either as a gift of the fixtures to the landlord,
or if not a gift, a waiver of any right to re-enter aind remove
them. It becomes therefore to some extent a question as to
the intention of the parties; and when the evidence clearly
shows there was no intention on the part of the tenant to relinquish his unquestioned right to the fixtures, and there is also
evidence showing that the landlord understood such intention
and acquiesced therein by promising him that he might remove
them after the surrender, the right is not lost." Bank v. Merrill Co., 69 Wis. 5or (1887). Why the right is not lost in this
case, but is lost in the case of a renewal, it is difficult to understand. Surely a renewal of the lease shows a manifest intention

NOTES.

not to abandon them to the landlord. Tyler on Fixtures, page
443, says: "The doctrine is that a tenant holding over after
the expiration of the term is presumed to continue in occupation of the demised premises upon the same terms as under the
original lease; and hence in such a case the tenant is not
estopped from claiming his fixtures, as in the case of an express
new lease, upon an actual or implied surrender of possession
of the premises under the old one." He gives no reason why
there should be a difference, and it is difficult to see why there
should be. In the first case there is an implied renewal of the
lease and in the second an express renewal. Justice Cooley in
Kerr v. Kingsbury, supra., in discussing the difference between
a tenant " holding over" and one who secures a renewal says:
"A regard for the succeeding interests is the only substantial
reason for the rule which requires the tenant to remove the
fixtures during the term: indeed, the law does not in strictness require of him that he shall remove them during the term,
but only before he surrenders possession and during the time
that he has a right to regard himself as occupying in the character of a tenant. But why the right should be lost when the
tenant, instead of surrendering possession, takes a renewal of
the lease is not apparent. There is certainly no reason of
public policy to sustain such a doctrine; on the contrary, the
reasons which saved to the tenant his right to the fixtures in
the first place are equally influential to save to him on a renewal what was unquestionably his before. What could possibly be more absurd than a rule of law which should in effect
say to the tenant who is about to obtain a renewal, 'If you will
be at the expense and trouble and incur the loss of removing
your erections during the term and of afterwards bringing them
back again, they shall be yours, otherwise you will be deemed
to abandon them to your landlord."
If the rule as laid down in Loughrarn v. Ross, supra, were
followed, in almost every case tenants would be deprived of
their fixtures with absolutely no intention to part with them.
Under the New York decision, in order to save his- fixtures
he must do one of two things-viz., either have his landlord
except them from the lease, or remove them one day and bring
them back the next. The latter would be a needless waste of
money. In regard to the former, no matter how careful a
tenant is, he would not consider it necessary to have his landlord except from the lease that which is the tenant's own property. On the other hand, the decision of gadey v. McCurdy,
supra, seems to be a perfectly sound doctrine. It is difficult
to conceive of a case in which any hardship would result fiom
its application.
G.S.

